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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 6418
This paper investigates the effect of exposure to violent 
conflict on human capital accumulation in Burundi. It 
combines a nationwide household survey with secondary 
sources on the location and timing of the conflict. Only 
20 percent of the birth cohorts studied (1971–1986) 
completed primary education. Depending on the 
specification, the probability of completing primary 
schooling for a boy exposed to violent conflict declines by 
This paper is a product of the Partnerships, Capacity Building Unit, Development Economics Vice Presidency. It is part 
of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The authors may be contacted at philip.verwimp@ulb.ac.be and jan.vanbavel@soc.kuleuven.be.
7 to 17 percentage points compared to a nonexposed boy, 
with a decline of 11 percentage points in the preferred 
specification. In addition, exposure to violent conflict 
reduces the gender gap in schooling, but only for girls 
from nonpoor households. Forced displacement is one 
of the channels through which conflict affects schooling. 
The results are robust to various specifications and 
estimation methods.
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During the past 30 years, civil conflict has affected almost three-fourths of all 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Economists have studied the 
causes of war and their role in reducing growth and development (Collier and Hoeffler 
1998; Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004; Guidolin and La Ferrara 2007). The long-
term economic consequences are particularly debated in the literature. Authors who find 
rapid economic recovery after war include Davis and Weinstein (2002) for Japan, 
Brakman, Garretsen, and Schramm (2004) for Germany, Miguel and Roland (2006) for 
Vietnam, and Bellows and Miguel (2009) for Sierra Leone. Convergence toward the 
country’s long-term growth path is reached relatively rapidly, often within 15 years, as 
predicted by a neo-classical growth model.  
The relatively rapid recovery of economic growth and other macro-level 
indicators do not tell us much about the distribution of long-term consequences at the 
micro level. This paper considers the consequences of civil war for human capital 
accumulation at the individual level. Gender differences are a critical source of 
heterogeneity in this respect; however, the direction of the gender effect is an empirical 
question. If, for example, conflicting parties engage child soldiers, it is likely that boys 
will be more affected than girls. Existing gender inequalities may be exacerbated during 
violent conflict; however, these inequalities may also be attenuated. For example, if a 
country needs the brains and labor of young women to work in the military industry 
during a dispute with a neighbor, the labor market position of women may benefit from 
the conflict. There is no universal rule to predict what the gender-specific impact will be. 
The gender-specific impact may be exacerbated in one domain (e.g., sexual violence), or 
the conflict may offer new opportunities (e.g., in paid labor or business). The direction of 
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the effects as well as their magnitude differ from country to country and context to 
context depending on preexisting gender inequalities, the type of conflict, the duration of 
the conflict, and the institutional particularities of the war-affected country.  
This paper focuses on the effect of civil war on schooling in Burundi. We attempt 
to determine the direction and magnitude of this effect in terms of schooling for both 
boys and girls. If schooling is negatively affected, this may, in turn, affect subsequent 
choices and opportunities for both men and women, including access to paid labor, age at 
marriage, number of children, and the socioeconomic characteristics of spouses. The 
level of schooling attained as a child and young adult is a fundamental driver of welfare 
throughout one’s life. 
 We work with the Enquête Démographique et de Santé collected by UNFPA in 
2002. This survey contains detailed information on each member of the interviewed 
households, including all births and deaths, schooling, wealth, and the history of 
migration during the civil war. We combine these surveys with event data on the location 
and timing of the conflict. The empirical identification strategy exploits variation in the 
onset and duration of the conflict across Burundi’s provinces and related variation to 
determine which cohorts of children were exposed to the massacres and the civil war 
during their school-aged years.  
We find that the completion of primary schooling in Burundi is affected by the 
massacres and the subsequent civil war. For every year that a school-aged boy was 
exposed to conflict in his province of residence, his probability of completing primary 
schooling decreased by 6 percentage points in our preferred specification. Boys from 
both poor and nonpoor households suffer from war. Girls suffer a general schooling 
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disadvantage in Burundi; however, we find that violent conflict reduces the gender gap, 
although only for girls from nonpoor households. We show that forced displacement is 
one of the channels through which violent conflict affects schooling. 
 
I. Review of the literature on schooling, gender, and conflict 
There is a body of research analyzing how households cope with economic or 
agricultural shocks, such as crop failures, famines, or droughts (Fafchamps, Udry, and 
Czukas 1998; Dercon 2004), but there is little work on the microeconomic consequences 
of violent or nonviolent political shocks. Although few households have formal insurance 
against economic shocks, many have informal insurance mechanisms that they can use, 
such as self-insurance (portfolio spread, income diversification, temporary migration), 
village-level solidarity mechanisms, or even outside insurance against weather calamities 
(Dercon 2004). Such insurance mechanisms appear not to be available for political risks; 
at least, the scholarly community has largely failed to study potential coping mechanisms 
for political shocks. One of the findings of the coping literature in development 
economics is that nonpoor households are better able to cope with negative economic 
shocks compared to poor households. Using assets, savings, or their social capital, 
nonpoor households are more successful at cushioning the negative impact of weather, 
disease, or price shocks. The nascent literature on political shocks suggests that this poor 
versus nonpoor divide in terms of coping is nonexistent or much smaller than in the case 
of economic shocks. In the event of antiurban, Marxist, or cultural revolution-type 
conflicts, the nonpoor, educated part of the population may be hit harder than the poor 
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uneducated part, with completely different effects on their welfare in comparison to 
economic or agricultural shocks.  
Shemyakina’s (2006) empirical work on violent conflict in Tajikistan finds that 
girls suffer a greater loss in education compared to boys. She attributes this finding to 
concerns over safety and low returns on girls’ education. In contrast, Akresh and de 
Walque (2008) find that male Rwandan children in nonpoor households incur the 
strongest effect. Evans and Miguel (2004) find that young children in rural Kenya are 
more likely to drop out of school after their parents’ death and that this effect is 
particularly strong for children who lose their mothers. Although Kenya was not the 
scene of violent conflict during the observed period, the finding is relevant because 
violent conflict produces many orphans, which may have a similar effect on children’s 
schooling. 
Combining a household panel with detailed data on allied bombings of German 
cities during WWII, Akbulut-Yuksel (2009) finds significant, long-lasting, detrimental 
effects of bombing on the human capital and labor market outcomes of individuals who 
were school aged during WWII. These individuals had 0.4 fewer years of schooling, on 
average, in adulthood in comparison to individuals not affected by the bombings. On 
average, affected children experienced a reduction of 6 percent in labor market earnings 
in relation to unaffected children.  
 Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2006) find that Zimbabwean children affected 
by the civil war in the 1970s completed fewer grades of schooling or started school later 
than those not affected by the shocks. Similar results are found by Leόn (2011) for Peru, 
by Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) for Colombia, by 
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Chamarbagwala and Morán (2010) for Guatemala, and by de Walque (2006) for 
Cambodia.  
The reasons that education during the war may be affected negatively include 
school closure, migration and displacement, the quality and availability of school 
facilities, and shocks to income and security (Justino 2011). Chamarbagwala and Morán 
(2010) find that individuals who were school aged in areas that were more affected by the 
war (1979–1984) in Guatemala completed fewer years of schooling and that this effect 
was stronger for girls. Their study suggests that loss of property and massive 
displacement led households to reallocate limited resources to providing young boys and, 
to a lesser extent, young girls with at least some primary education. Although both boys 
and girls received less secondary education as a result of the civil war, the effects were 
more pronounced for girls.  
Justino (2011) observes that children who are needed to replace labor may be 
removed from school, which may deplete households of their stock of human capital for 
future generations. Akresh and de Walque (2009) and Shemyakina (2006) point to this 
mechanism as an explanation for the reduction in educational attainment and enrollment 
observed in contexts of civil war. In a recent paper, Rodriguez and Sanchez (2009) find 
that violent attacks in Colombian municipalities by armed groups have significantly 
increased the probability of school dropouts and the inclusion of children in the labor 
market. We add that not only is the young generation is prevented from acquiring human 
capital, but educated members of older cohorts may be disproportionably killed, thereby 
depriving the country of its human capital stock.  
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II. Conflict, the economy, and education in Burundi 
The 1990s were a particularly violent decade in Central Africa’s history. Burundi 
and Rwanda experienced several episodes of mass murder and genocide, and the regional 
civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo created an enormous loss of life and 
socioeconomic destruction. Most of the recent work on Burundi focuses on the causes of 
the latest episode of civil conflict (Nkurunziza and Ngaruko 2000), the progression of the 
crisis (Chrétien and Mukuri 2000), the year-by-year political dimensions of the conflict 
(Reyntjens and Vandeginste 1997; Reyntjens 1998), and possible conflict solutions 
(Ndikumana 2000). The proportion of people living below the nationally defined poverty 
line increased during this period from 35 to 68 percent, and the conflict led to double-
digit inflation rates, which peaked at over 30 percent in 1997 (all figures from IMF 
2007). 
Civil conflict in Burundi began in 1965, three years after independence from the 
Belgian colonial administration, when a group of Hutu officers unsuccessfully attempted 
to seize power and overthrow the monarchy. This failed coup led to a purge of Hutu from 
the army and government and marked the beginning of the political exclusion of the Hutu 
majority by the Tutsi minority. Power became the sole monopoly of the Tutsi, who 
effectively seized power in 1966 and proclaimed the First Republic. In 1972, a Hutu 
insurgency began in southwestern Burundi, resulting in considerable loss of life among 
the Tutsi residents. The subsequent Tutsi army repression eliminated all educated Hutu 
(Lemarchand 1994). 
The next major confrontation was in 1988, when a Hutu insurgency began in the 
north. As in 1972, army repression was swift and took a heavy toll on local Hutus. 
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However, unlike in 1972, the international community condemned the massacres and 
pressured the Buyoya regime to liberalize its political system. In June 1993, this situation 
led to the first free and fair elections in postindependence Burundi. The democratic 
transition did not last long. In October 1993, Melchior Ndadaye, the first democratically 
elected president and a Hutu, was assassinated by Tutsi army elements in a failed coup 
attempt, marking the start of another civil war. As the news spread to the rural provinces, 
Hutu peasants committed large-scale massacres of Tutsi and Hutu-supporting Union for 
National Progress (Union pour le Progrès national). Chrétien (1997) writes that districts 
in certain provinces were “almost completely ‘cleansed’ of all Tutsi elements.” The Tutsi 
army retaliated against the Hutu, continuing what would become the most severe civil 
war in Burundi’s history in terms of both human lives and socioeconomic destruction 
(Ndikumana 2000). 
 
<<B>>Spatial and Temporal Intensity of the Conflict 
In this paper, we use the term “violent conflict” to describe the massacres that 
occurred in the 1993–1994 period as well as the subsequent civil war. Because the exact 
timing and location of the massacres and the civil war plays an important role in our 
identification strategy (see section 4), we describe the evolution of the massacres and the 
civil war through time and space as follows:  
 
• In 1993 and 1994, massacres occurred in many parts of the country with different 
intensities. 
• From the end of 1994 to July 1996, civil war spread throughout the country. 
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• From July 1996 to August 2000, Major Buyoya returned to power after a bloodless 
coup. The civil war intensity was lower in most provinces, and the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement was signed in 2000. 
 
The massacres were particularly intense in central and northern Burundi. Bundervoet 
(2009) estimates that in half of the provinces, more than 7 percent of all individuals lost 
their fathers in 1993. Table 1 provides the data per province and sketches the evolution of 
the civil war based on Chrétien and Mukuri (2000). Fighting began in October 1994 in 
the northwestern provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural, and Ngozi. By early 
1995, the violence spread to the bordering Kayanza province, and by April 1995, 
massacres of civilians and confrontations between army and rebel forces occurred in 
Karuzi, Bururi, Ruyigi, and Muyinga. By late 1995, fighting occurred in the central 
provinces of Gitega and Muramvya and the northern province of Kirundo. By then, the 
conflict had spread to almost all of the provinces of Burundi, with the exception of 
Cankuzo (in the east of the country) and Rutana and Makamba (in the south of the 
country). In July 1996, former president Buyoya again seized power in a bloodless coup 
d’état backed by the army. During late 1996 and early 1997, the armed conflict continued 
in Kayanza, Muramvya, Kirundo, and Gitega. In April 1997, the Arusha peace talks 
between the principal conflict parties began. In late 1997, insecurity increased again in 
Cibitoke, Bubanza, and Bujumbura Rural, provinces that remained unsafe until 1999.  
The various conflict accounts provide no definitive explanation for why the 
massacres and the civil war affected some provinces earlier than others. However, the 
conflict’s spatial spread was influenced by geography and natural endowments: (i) the  
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 TABLE 1. Primary Education Completed, by Province of Residence and 
 Exposure to Violent Conflict 
Province of 
residence in 
1993 
Death 
rate 
1993 
 
Poverty  
head 
count  
in  
1990 
Timing of 
the civil war 
1995–1998 
Primary education (% 
completed) 
t test on 
the means 
(6) – (5) Not exposed to 
violent conflict 
Exposed to 
 violent 
conflict 
      (1)     (2)   (3)       (4)         (5)         (6)      (7) 
Bubanza 4.2 22.4 1995–1998 15.90   [3.9] 2.4       [2.4] −13.47** 
Bujumbura 
Rurale 
5.4 25.7 1995–1998 26.20   [2.7] 28.64   [3.3] 2.43 
Bururi 3.8 37.7 1995/1996 25.04   [1.7] 18.97   [2.4]  −6.06** 
Cankuzo 2.5 25.1 not affected  16.36  [2.0] -  
Cibitoke 4.9 19.6 1995–1998   8.60   [2.3]   6.94   [3.0]  −1.66 
Gitega 21.9 35.2 1996/1997 32.81   [3.4] 28.50   [2.4]  −4.03 
Karuzi 26.7 66.8 1995/1996 23.20   [3.8]   9.60   [2.6]  
−13.60*** 
Kayanza 35.4 44.9 1995/1996 27.01   [3.0] 20.70   [2.4]  −6.30* 
Mwaro 12.8 24.0 1996/1997 20.85   [3.2] 10.81   [2.6]  
−10.04*** 
Makamba 1.7 39.7 1996–1998   9.70   [1.1]   8.38   [1.5]  −1.32 
Kirundo 12.1 34.0 1996/1997 22.00   [3.4]  16.23  [3.0]  −5.76* 
Muyinga 16.0 27.8 1995/1996 21.17   [3.5]  11.29  [2.4]  −9.86*** 
Muramvya 7.8 24.0 1996/1997 39.43   [5.8]  25.97   [2.4]  −13.46** 
Ngozi 25.7 42.5 1995/1996 16.81   [2.5]   9.44   [1.9]  −7.37*** 
Rutana 5.3 58.0 not affected   9.9     [2.8] -  
Ruyigi 6.7 41.0 1995/1996 19.05   [3.8] 25.00   [8.3]  5.95 
       
Rural 
Burundi 
7%  
median 
36.2 2.28 years 
average 
 19.79  [0.7]  15.98  [0.8]  −3.81*** 
Source: Bundervoet (2009), Republic of Burundi and World Bank (1995), Chrétien and Mukuri (2000), 
United Nations (1996), Bundervoet et al. (2009), UNFPA Enquête Démographique et de Santé (2002). 
Note: Column (2) shows the percentage of survey respondents whose fathers were killed in the 1993 
massacres; column (3) shows the Poverty Head Count; and column (4) shows the spread of the civil war 
over time and space. We only consider the “relevant” duration, which is the period during which school-
aged children from the 1981–1986 birth cohorts could have been exposed to violence. Column (5) shows 
the birth cohorts not exposed to violent conflict (neither massacres nor the civil war) when they were 
between 7 and 12 years of age; column (6) shows the birth cohorts exposed to violent conflict (massacres, 
civil war, or both) when they were between 7 and 12 years of age. Standard errors are presented between 
brackets. *** significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
 
proximity of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s North Kivu region where the rebels 
had a base, explaining the early onset of war in the provinces of Cibitoke, Bubanza, and 
Bujumbura Rural; (ii) the presence of the Kibira forest in the north, which also served as 
a rebel base, explaining the spread of war to Kayanza and Ngozi provinces; and (iii) the 
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Tanganyika Lake, which allowed the use of boats to bring the war to the southern 
province of Makamba. 
 
Civilian Impacts of the Conflict 
Between 1994 and 2001, an estimated 200,000 people lost their lives, a majority of 
them civilians (UNFPA 2002). To understand the micro-level impact of the war, we 
focus on displacement, looting of household assets, and the theft and burning of crops.1 
First, in its 2002 Demographic and Health Survey, UNFPA found that over 50 
percent of the rural population had been displaced from their homes at least once between 
1993 and 2000 as a result of violence. The average displacement duration for the entire 
sample was just over one year, meaning three agricultural seasons were missed because 
households could not cultivate or harvest their fields while they were displaced (UNFPA 
2004). Displacement also meant that individuals were more likely to contract water- and 
vector-borne diseases while hiding in the forest. Because people could not carry 
significant amounts of food when fleeing their villages, adequate nutrition was a problem. 
Displacement also implied a lack of access to markets, health clinics, and schools 
because roads were unsafe or these structures had been damaged. Later in the war, 
civilians were forced into local resettlement camps by the government, and the camp 
conditions were poor (Human Rights Watch 2000). The displacement’s impact on 
aggregate production from 1993 to 1998 showed production declines of 15 percent in 
cereals, 11 percent in roots and tubers, and 14 percent in fruits and vegetables, with 
particularly dramatic declines in 1994 and 1995. Later in this paper, we will test the 
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impact of displacement on schooling as a potential channel by which exposure to violent 
conflict can affect child schooling. 
When the conflict ended in a given province, displaced households returned to 
their homes and fields. However, humanitarian interventions by either the government or 
nongovernmental organizations after the fighting ended were practically nonexistent 
because of the continued insecurity on all roads linking the capital, Bujumbura, to the 
countryside. By early 1995, rebel groups had begun to target and kill foreign 
nongovernmental organization workers and journalists who left Bujumbura to visit war 
regions. International development assistance dropped sharply during the crisis, from 
almost $320 million before 1993 to below $100 million in 1999 (IMF 2007). 
Second, in addition to the displacement and killing of civilians, both rebel and 
government forces engaged in the looting of civilian property, particularly livestock, 
causing an unprecedented drop in household capital stock. Aggregate national figures 
show that the number of tropical livestock units in the country declined by 23 percent 
from 1990 to 1998, a decline that was predominantly due to theft and pillaging.  
Third, Human Rights Watch reports (1998) document the theft and burning of 
household crops. Crops were stolen from fields and granaries, and coffee trees were 
particularly targeted for burning. Because coffee is the government’s main source of tax 
revenue, rebels frequently burned coffee plantations to reduce government revenue, 
although we cannot quantify the magnitude of this destruction. Coffee is also an 
important source of income for small farmers who had less income to pay for other 
expenditures, including purchasing food crops, school fees, or health care.  
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Fourth, the conflict in Burundi is notorious for its adverse impact on women and 
girls. Rape was widespread, and there were many instances of brutality, even against 
children. Gender roles became more entrenched as boys and men were drafted by the 
army or recruited by rebel movements.  
 
Education and Conflict in Burundi 
Access to education has been a long-standing source of inequality, tension, and 
conflict. In the cohorts under study, only 20 percent completed primary schooling. 
Education is directly related to jobs in the public sector, for which degree holders have 
the monopoly. The education system and jobs in the administration were dominated by 
Tutsi from the southern region of Bururi. Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2002) write that in 
1972, almost all educated Hutu were killed by the Tutsi army. Education was clearly a 
liability at that time.  
In a new report on education and violent conflict, UNESCO (2011, p.51) 
calculates that the onset of conflict in Burundi marked an abrupt change in school 
enrollment. The decade before the conflict (1981–1991) saw an expansion of enrollment 
for each new cohort, male and female. The gross enrollment rate increased from 33.2 to 
70 percent in that decade (Ministère de l’Education 1999). The conflict-induced trend 
reversal can be observed in figure 1, which we computed with UNFPA 2002 data. The 
birth cohorts that could finish primary schooling before the beginning of the conflict 
show an upward trend in primary school completion, from a rate of less than 20 to almost 
30 percent. The cohorts born between 1975 and 1980 show the highest primary school 
completion rates in the history of Burundi (up to 2005). This high completion rate was 
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due to the expansion of primary education, which doubled the enrollment rate in five 
years (1982–1987) (UNESCO 1999; UNICEF 2008). Progress stops for the birth cohorts 
born at the end of the 1970s and is reversed from the 1980 birth cohorts onward, just 
when the first birth cohorts are confronted with the start of the violence. Children in 
Burundi officially attend primary school from age 7 to age 12, when they finish sixth 
grade (UNESCO 2011). Some children may start schooling later and complete primary 
schooling at a later age.  
Figure 2 provides the key variables of our empirical approach (see below). Girls 
fare worse than boys, children from poor households fare worse compared to children 
from nonpoor households, and exposure to conflict negatively affects completion rates. 
Poverty at the household level is defined by livestock ownership before the start of the 
massacres and the civil war. This variable is the only preconflict wealth indicator 
available in the UNFPA survey (see below) and was registered through a recall question. 
Livestock ownership is one of the most important manifestations of wealth in rural 
Burundi.  
The interaction of gender, poverty, and exposure in figure 2 offers surprising 
insights: the completion rate for girls from nonpoor households exposed to conflict is 
almost the same as for boys exposed to conflict, but it is significantly different for 
nonexposed boys and girls from nonpoor households. Moreover, we do not find this 
gender-gap-reducing effect of conflict on schooling for children in poor households.  
In an extensive review of the damage to the education sector during the conflict in 
Burundi, Obura (2008, 94-96 and 99) observes that schools were destroyed or looted and 
teachers and children killed or displaced. Importantly, although the gross enrollment rate  
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Figure 1. Primary School Completion by Birth Cohort 
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Figure 2. Primary School Completion by Gender, Wealth, and Exposure to Conflict 
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decreased, the Gender Parity Index did not decline during the conflict and even improved 
slightly, from 0.80 to 0.83. Obura also notes that a church-led education initiative, called 
Yaga Mukama, which existed before the war and provided two days of primary-school-
level education per week to the rural poor, became very popular during the war and even 
acted as a substitute for formal education in affected areas.  
 
III. Data and Identification Strategy 
In 2002, UNFPA collected demographic and health data (through the Enquête 
Démographique et de Santé) on almost 7,000 households. At the time of the survey, 
many Burundesi lived in camps for internally displaced persons. A particular feature of 
this survey is that it is stratified over urban, rural, and camp locations in each province of 
the country. Weights are assigned to each observation in the survey representing the 
inverse of the probability of that observation being drawn in each sampled location. The 
sampling is based on a total population count by the National Institute of Statistics 
(L’Institut de Statistique et d’Etudes Economiques du Burundi) the year before the 
survey.2 The focus of the survey is on household composition, schooling, and health, 
with significant attention to the potential impact of the conflict through displacement. 
Descriptive data are presented in tables 1 and 2. In our analysis, we dropped the 
observations from the capital of Bujumbura because it is nearly impossible to determine 
exactly when the population of Bujumbura was affected by the conflict. Arguments can 
be made for a very short as well as a very long time.  
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TABLE 2. Individual and Household Characteristics, by Exposure to Violent Conflict (N = 
5,856) 
Name of the variable Values Not exposed to 
violent conflict 
(n = 3,586) (+) 
Exposed to 
 violent conflict 
(n = 2,266) (+) 
t test on 
 the means 
(2) – (1) 
             (1)            (2)          (3) 
At the individual level     
Age 16–31 25.1       [0.06]  
              (3.79) 
17.8      [0.03]  
             (1.51) 
 −7.3*** 
Sex (% female) 0–1 60.6       [0.81]  
              (0.48) 
56.5      [1.04]  
             (0.49) 
 −4.1*** 
Completed primary 
 Education 
0–1 19.8       [0.66]  
              (0.40) 
16.1      [0.77]  
             (0.38) 
 −3.7*** 
No. of years exposed 
 to violent conflict 
0–4 0            [0.00] 
              (0.00) 
2.28      [0.02] 
             (0.94) 
2.28*** 
Number of times moved 
residence 
0–4 0.087     [0.01] 
               (0.39) 
1.00      [0.02] 
             (1.03) 
0.91*** 
Years spent in a 
 displacement camp 
0–8 0.015     [0.01] 
              (0.18) 
0.89      [0.03] 
             (1.66) 
0.87*** 
At the household level     
Prewar wealth 
(Livestock in 1993) 
0–20 1.45        [0.55] 
               (4.76) 
2.02       [0.84] 
              (5.76) 
0.57*** 
Source: UNFPA Enquête Démographique et de Santé (2002), Chrétien and Mukuri (2000), United Nations 
(1996), and Bundervoet et al. (2009).  
Note: We only consider the “relevant”’ duration, which is the period that school-aged children from the 
1981–1986 birth cohorts could have been exposed to the violence. (+) represents proportions in the case of 
binary variables and averages in the case of continuous variables. Standard errors are presented in brackets; 
standard deviations are presented in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 
percent.  
 
 
Conflict Variables  
We construct four conflict exposure variables. The first two variables are general 
indicators of exposure to violent conflict, and the last two variables represent potential 
impact channels of conflict on education. First, we construct a binary variable to indicate 
whether a child resided in a province characterized by violent conflict. To determine 
which provinces were affected by the massacres (in 1993–1994) and the civil war (1995–
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1998), we use two sources.3 For the massacres, we rely on Bundervoet (2009), who 
computed the percentage of people whose fathers were killed. He applied the method 
proposed by Gakidou and King (2006) to correct for selection bias resulting from the 
absence from the survey of households where everyone was killed. Using that estimate 
(reproduced in table 2), we distinguish between eight provinces with a death rate higher 
than the median death rate (7 percent) and eight provinces with a lower death rate. The 
eight provinces with a lower than median death rate are defined as nonaffected provinces; 
the eight other provinces are defined as affected provinces. For exposure to the civil war, 
we rely on Chrétien and Mukuri (2000), who describe the spread of the violence over 
space and time. A child residing in a province engulfed by civil war during the child’s 
primary school age is defined as exposed to civil war. We combine the exposure to 
massacres and to the subsequent civil war in one’s province of residence during school 
age into one exposure variable. 
Second, we determine the number of years that a child was exposed to violent 
conflict during the child’s primary school ages. This variable is based on the combination 
of year of birth and province of residence at the onset of conflict. We cannot exclude the 
possibility that children moved to a more peaceful province after the onset of war in their 
province of residence. In that case, we overestimate the duration of exposure, yielding a 
conservative estimate of the effect of conflict on schooling. However, UNFPA (2012, 
141) notes that most conflict-induced migration occurred locally, within the same 
province. In addition, we test for individual exposure channels, such as the frequency of 
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forced displacement and the time spent in a displacement camp, which are not measured 
at the level of the province of residence. 
Many children born in the 1981–1986 period experienced at least one year of 
conflict during their primary school career. The oldest ones, born in 1981, were about to 
graduate from primary school when the conflict began. Depending on the province of 
residence, younger children experienced no, some, or many violent conflict during their 
school ages. Not all provinces were affected at the same time. In principle, the maximum 
duration of exposure to conflict during primary school age is six years. In practice, we do 
not find children exposed for more than four years in our sample. 
The two other exposure-to-conflict variables are constructed directly from the 
UNFPA survey to index channels of influence of conflict on education. One variable is 
the number of times the child had to move residence forcibly during the massacres and 
the civil war. The other variable is the number of years the child spent in a displacement 
camp, again during primary school age.  
 
Identification Strategy 
Our basic approach is a difference-in-differences strategy. We use the spatial and 
temporal variation of violent conflict in Burundi to infer the effect of exposure on child 
schooling. We compare children who were exposed to several years of conflict in their 
province of residence during their school-aged years with children of the same age 
residing in provinces that were not significantly affected and with children who were old 
enough to complete their schooling before the conflict started in both affected and 
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nonaffected provinces. Building on figure 2 and previous tabulations, our baseline 
specification is a linear probability model of the following form: 
 
( ) ijtijttjijt ZExposureSchooling εγβδα ++++= 1 ,         (1) 
 
where Schooling is our binary education variable for having completed primary school or 
not, measured for a child i residing in province j and born at time t. We denote with αj the 
province fixed effects, with δt the birth cohort fixed effects, and with εijt a random error 
term. The last term has an individual- and a household-level component. First, we 
calculate the Exposurejt variable as a binary measure to indicate a child residing in a 
province j that experienced violent conflict at the time when birth cohort t was of primary 
school age. Second, we use our estimate of the duration in number of years of exposure 
for a child residing in an affected province. In the latter case, β1, the coefficient of 
interest, measures the impact on schooling of an additional year of exposure to violent 
conflict. Including all provinces allows us to use variation in onset as well as in the 
duration of conflict across provinces to identify the war’s causal impact on children’s 
schooling. The provincial fixed effects control for any unobserved effect that does not 
change over time. To capture potential trends at the province level, we estimate a 
specification with province-level time trends. In section 6, we will test whether our 
variable of interest captures prewar province-level trends correlated with the duration of 
conflict.  
 In some specifications, we control for characteristics that are specific to the 
household in which the child lives. Importantly, and to avoid endogeneity, these 
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household-level characteristics are measured in 1993, before the start of the conflict. Z is 
a vector of child-specific characteristics, such as the age, sex, level of education of the 
head of the household, and the wealth of the household. We do not include the Z 
variables in all specifications because by 1993, the older cohorts had already left their 
parental households; thus, these variables cannot affect their school completion.  
 We cluster our standard errors at the province level to control for intraprovince 
correlations (Bertrand et al. 2004). Clustering should occur at the province level because 
our shock is coded at this level. We face a problem of low numbers of clusters, leading to 
larger standard errors and coefficients that are imprecisely estimated. We therefore use 
the bootstrapping method proposed by Cameron et al. (2008) to improve the estimation.  
As stated in section 3.1, the spatial onset and subsequent spread of the war was 
determined by the proximity of a province to the border with the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, the Kibira forest, or the Tanganyika Lake. These factors are exogenous to the 
level of education or other household characteristics. Voors et al. (2012) do not find 
evidence of the endogeneity of education (and other household characteristics) and 
exposure to violence at the household and village level. Although the authors cannot 
exclude occurrences of targeted violence, they note that “the probability of incorrectly 
maintaining the null of non-targeted violence is acceptably small” (950).  
 Furthermore, because the impact of conflict may differ according to the age at 
which the impact is felt, we also account for the age-specific onset of conflict in a 
separate set of regressions. In this case, the coefficient of the variable of interest indicates 
the effect of the onset of conflict in the province of residence at a given age on the 
probability of completing primary schooling.  
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 Because we are also interested in a potential gendered effect of the impact of the 
civil war on human capital accumulation, we estimate the following specification: 
 
ijtjtiijttjijt ExposureSSExposureSchooling εγβββδα ++++++= i321 Z )*()( ,      (2) 
 
where Si is the sex of the child (Si = 1 for girls), and the other variables are as in 
specification (1). In this specification, β1 gives the effect of violent conflict on schooling 
for boys. The interaction effect between gender and conflict tells us whether there is an 
additional effect for girls, and the sum of β1 and β3 gives the total effect of conflict on 
schooling for girls. In addition, the sum of β2 and β3 gives the total effect of gender on 
schooling. 
 The above specifications do not specify the mechanism through which the impact 
of the conflict is channeled; the specification only provides a generic “exposure to civil 
war variable” in binary form, in number of years of exposure, or in age-specific onset. To 
analyze particular channels in more detail, we develop other specifications that use 
alternative measures of conflict to indicate a specific mechanism: 
     
( ) ijtiitjijt ZChannelSchooling εγβδα ++++= 1 .                 (3) 
 
The channels are the time spent in a displacement camp during school age and the 
number of times the child moved residence during school age.  
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IV. Findings 
In table 3, we use the binary shock exposure variable that takes the value of one 
for children exposed to violent conflict in their province of residence during their school 
age years and zero for nonexposed individuals. The regressions in columns 1–3 are linear 
probability models. In the first column, we control for province and year of birth fixed 
effects and find that the coefficient of our variable of interest (exposure to violent 
conflict) is −0.09, which means that the probability of completing primary schooling is 9 
percentage points lower for children exposed to violence. Girls have a lower probability 
of completing primary schooling; however, there is a small, positive coefficient for the 
female*conflict exposure interaction variable. Given the rather large standard error, we 
are not able to interpret the point estimate of this interaction effect in column 1, an effect 
that is also not statistically significantly different from zero. Preconflict wealth, measured 
as livestock holdings, increases the probability of completing primary school. Columns 2 
and 3 repeat the analysis controlling for linear age effects and for province-specific time 
trends. This control increases the magnitude of the coefficient of the variable of interest 
but affects neither the gender nor the interaction effect.  
Driven by our exposure variable, which is measured at the province level, we 
need to cluster at that level (Bertrand et al. 2004). However, we have a small number of 
clusters. Standard errors for our variable of interest in the linear probability specifications 
are typically one-half to one-quarter of the magnitude of the coefficient of interest. These 
coefficients are thus imprecisely estimated and do not allow an interpretation of the point 
estimates.4  
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We use a well-developed method to address a small number of clusters, the CGM 
bootstrapping method, named after Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008). The key 
element of the CGM method is that it resamples entire clusters and provides asymptotic 
refinement, which leads to improved inference. A drawback of this method is that the 
accompanying variance-covariance matrix cannot be calculated in the presence of fixed 
effects at the level of the clusters.5 Therefore, we run the CGM regression without fixed 
effects. We keep in mind (referring to the difference between columns 2 and 1) that this 
may overestimate the effect of exposure to conflict. The magnitude of the resulting 
coefficient (0.11), however, remains on the order of the previous estimates. 
Given the small standard errors in the CGM procedure and the statistical 
significance of the gender*conflict dummy interaction, we are able to interpret the point 
estimates resulting from the regression in column 4. The female*conflict interaction 
yields a coefficient of +0.03 with a standard error of 0.01 and is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level, meaning that the conflict in Burundi diminished 
the gender-gap in schooling somewhat. However, the gap still exists (−0.06 + 0.03 = 
−0.03). This result in the case of the binary exposure variable is only obtained if we 
weigh the regression with the sample weights provided in the survey, as column 5 shows. 
Therefore, caution is required in the interpretation of the interaction effect.  
Repeating the analysis for poor and nonpoor households separately, we find in 
columns 6 and 7 that violent conflict diminishes the female disadvantage in schooling 
only for nonpoor households. The linear combination of the female and the 
female*exposure variables yields a coefficient of −0.02 (= −0.15 + 0.13) with a standard 
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error of 0.02 and is statistically not significantly different from zero at the usual 
thresholds. Thus, there is no longer a gender gap in schooling between girls and boys 
from nonpoor households who are exposed to violent conflict. This result remains the 
same when we remove the sample weights: a coefficient of −0.02 (= −0.127 + 0.106), a 
standard error of 0.03, and not statistically significantly different from zero at the usual 
thresholds (result not shown, available upon request). For girls from poor households, the 
linear combination is −0.03 (= −0.033 + 0.003) with a standard error of 0.01 and remains 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
 The F-test for the equality of the coefficients of interest for girls from poor and 
nonpoor households (i.e., the interaction of exposure and gender) in both equations 
confirms the above finding: 26.15***, with p < 0.001, meaning that the coefficients are 
not equal. This result corroborates the intuition behind figure 2 in which boys and girls 
from nonpoor households exposed to conflict have similar completion rates. In sum, in 
nonpoor households, school completion rates for boys decrease to the level of girls such 
that the gender gap almost disappears. In contrast, in poor households where school 
completion rates are lower, girls are as affected as boys such that the gender gap persists. 
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           TABLE 3. Linear Probability and CGM Regressions of Schooling, Conflict, Gender,  
           and Household Wealth, with Binary Conflict Exposure Variable  
 
 Dependent variable: 
Child completed six years 
 of primary schooling 
    (1)     (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)     (6)       (7) 
    All     All    All All All, no 
weights  
 Poor only Nonpoor 
    only 
    LPM    LPM    LPM CGM CGM   CGM   CGM 
Violent conflict shock  −0.09**  −0.16***  −0.17***  −0.11***  −0.07*  −0.11***  −0.14*** 
 [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.01] [0.04] [0.03] [0.04] 
        
Child is female  −0.08***  −0.08***  −0.07***  −0.06***  −0.07**  −0.03***  −0.15*** 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] 
        
Violent conflict*female 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03** 0.03 0.003 0.13*** 
 [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.04] 
        
Age (in years)   
−0.009*** 
  
−0.006*** 
 −0.002  
−0.006*** 
 
−0.006*** 
  [0.003]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
        
Prewar wealth 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.04*** 0.005*** 
 [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]  [0.01]  [0.002] 
        
Intercept     0.06* 0.40***   0.28*** 0.39*** 0.27***    0.34***  0.46*** 
   [0.03] [0.08]   [0.06] [0.03] [0.03]   [0.04] [0.47] 
        
Province fixed effects   Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Birth cohort fixed effects    Yes No No No No No No 
Province-specific time trend   No No Yes No No No No 
Sample Size 5,706 5,706 5,706 5,706 5,706 3,398 1,708 
  Source: UNFPA Enquête Démographique et de Santé (2002). 
Note: LPM represents linear probability model. Standard errors are presented between brackets. All regressions, except those in column (5), are weighted with 
the sample weights provided in the data set, and all regressions are clustered at the province level. *** significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 
percent.
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      TABLE 4. Linear Probability and CGM Regressions of Schooling, Conflict, Gender, 
           and Household Wealth, with Number of Years of Conflict Exposure 
Variable 
 
 Dependent variable: 
Child completed six years 
 of primary schooling 
     (1)  (2)    (3)       (4)        (5) 
All All All, no 
weights 
Poor only Nonpoor  
only 
LPM CGM  CGM CGM CGM 
Years of violent conflict 
exposure 
 −0.05**  −0.06***  −0.04***  −0.05***  
−0.08*** 
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
      
Child is female  −0.08***  −0.06***  −0.08***  −0.04***  
−0.14*** 
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.02] 
      
Violent conflict*female  0.02* 0.02*** 0.02 0.01*** 0.06*** 
 [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] 
      
Age in years   −0.01***  −0.01  −0.01***  
−0.01*** 
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
      
Prewar wealth 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.01*** 
 [0.008] [0.002] [0.003] [0.007] [0.001] 
      
Intercept  0.06  0.45  0.33  0.38  0.55 
 [0.04] [0.03] [0.08] [0.04] [0.04] 
      
Province fixed effects Yes No No No No 
Year of birth fixed effects Yes No No No No 
Sample size 5,706 5,706 5,706 3,998 1,708 
Source: UNFPA Enquête Démographique et de Santé (2002). 
Note: LPM represents linear probability model. Standard errors are presented between brackets. All 
regressions, except those in column (3), are weighted and clustered at the province level. *** significant at 
1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
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Proceeding to years of exposure as our variable of interest in table 4, we find that 
the magnitude of the coefficients is approximately half of the binary case. Every 
additional year of exposure to violent conflict reduces the probability of completing 
primary schooling by 5 to 6 percentage points overall (columns 1 and 2) and by 8 
percentage points for boys from nonpoor households (column 5). As shown in table 3, 
exposure to conflict diminishes the gender gap in primary school completion rates, 
particularly for girls from nonpoor households. The longer boys and girls are exposed to 
violent conflict, the stronger the reduction of the gender gap in school completion rates is. 
Again, referring to column 3, we arrive at this particular result only when using the 
sample weights provided in the survey. 
 Because exposure to shocks may have a different impact according to the age at 
which the child was exposed, we regress our outcome variable on a series of age-specific 
shocks. In table 5, we determine for each child the age at which the child experienced the 
onset of violent conflict in the province of residence. Furthermore, we interact these 
dummy variables with the female variable. Examining column 2, where the use of the 
CGM model yields small standard errors, we find that the first four years (ages 7 to 10) 
are crucial, in declining order of magnitude, rather than the last two years (ages 11 and 
12). For boys of poor households, the magnitude of the coefficients is smaller compared 
to boys from nonpoor households at all ages. The probability of completion of primary 
schooling for boys from nonpoor households decreases by 28, 21, 14, and 9 percentage 
points for the onset of conflict at ages 7, 8, 9, and 10 years, respectively. Table 5 clearly 
indicates that a cohort of children in Burundi was particularly affected by exposure to 
violent conflict if the conflict started in the province of residence at the moment that the 
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cohort should have started primary school. A child who had yet to start school or who 
had only completed one or two years of schooling at the start of the conflict may have 
been compelled to give up school. The gender gap in primary school completion, 
however, is reduced if the conflict starts at a young age in the province of residence of the 
child. Onset at an early age (up to age nine) reduces the gender-gap for girls from poor 
households. Onset at ages 10 to 12 aggravates the school completion chances of girls 
from poor households, in contrast to girls from nonpoor households. Onset at the ages of 
11 or 12 for boys from nonpoor households does not affect their completion chances. 
Most likely, these boys are able to make up for potential lost months or years of 
schooling because their parents believe that a degree is within reach. We also tested a 
linear interaction between age and gender to account for possible trends in female enrollment 
over time, separate from the effect of conflict. The results (not shown) indicate that the effect 
of onset of conflict for girls at a younger age is slightly smaller; the effect is larger for girls 
who are slightly older (11 and 12 years old). 
Exposure to violent conflict remains a broad term that is defined at the province-
birth cohort level. Based on this definition, we cannot derive the channel by which the 
education of children at school age is affected during conflict. Possible channels are the 
destruction of school buildings or insecurity that makes parents keep children at home. 
One possible channel that affected almost one out of three households in Burundi during 
the war was forced displacement. Our data allow us to test this channel in two ways. The 
survey registered the number of times that each household member had to move 
residence because of the fighting and the length of stay in a displacement camp. It 
appears plausible that these two events would have a negative effect on the probability of 
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a school-aged child completing primary schooling. Columns 1–3 in table 6 test these 
channels.  
We find that the frequency of forced displacement and the length of stay in a 
displacement camp matter for school completion. Being uprooted from one’s village 
because of ongoing or imminent violence proves to be disruptive to a child’s school 
career to the extent that it decreases the probability of completing primary schooling, 
particularly if it occurs several times. The magnitude of the length of stay in a 
displacement camp is smaller but remains statistically significantly different from zero. 
As in previous regressions, the coefficient of the interaction between gender and the two 
alternative conflict measures is positive and statistically significant, meaning that 
displacement reduces the gender gap in school completion. When we test the effect of the 
three channels of violence (exposure to battles, forced displacement, and duration of stay 
in a camp, in column 3), all three channels exercise a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the completion of primary schooling. The probability of completing primary 
schooling declines by 8 percentage points as a result of exposure to conflict in the 
province of residence, by 6 percentage points for every instance of forced displacement, 
and by 2 percentage points for every year spent in a displacement camp. Importantly, the 
interaction effects of the alternative conflict measures with gender aggravate the 
completion chances for girls from poor households. This result in column 5 is worse than 
our baseline result, where the gender gap for girls from poor households was neither 
reduced nor aggravated as a result of conflict exposure. These alternative measures thus 
show that the channel through which the conflict operates affects girls from poor and 
nonpoor households (column 6) differently. Displacement reduces the gender gap for the 
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latter but widens it for the former.6 We call for caution in the interpretation of the result 
because we cannot exclude the possibility of a third, unobserved intervening variable (or 
set of variables)that correlates both with the value of the channel variable and with the 
education variable. 
In columns 6 and 7, we perform robustness checks in which we omit the 1978–
1982 and 1971–1974 birth cohorts from the analysis. For the 1978–1982 cohorts, the 
argument can be made that we are not sure whether these birth cohorts are affected by the 
violence. Some pupils may still be in primary school when they are 13 to 16 years old, in 
which case these older birth cohorts would be affected by the massacres and the civil war 
toward the end of their primary school career and would not constitute an adequate 
control group. Valente’s (2011) paper on the schooling consequences of the conflict in 
Nepal makes a similar argument for dropping a few birth cohorts from the analysis. In 
column 6 of table 6, we thus infer the effects of violent conflict on affected cohorts when 
we are certain that the control group never experienced violence during their school
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   TABLE 5. Linear Probability and CGM Regressions of Schooling, Conflict, Gender,  
                              and Household Wealth, with Age-Specific Conflict Onset 
 Dependent variable: 
Child completed six years 
 of primary schooling 
     (1)        (2)        (3) 
All All Poor only Nonpoor only 
LPM CGM CGM CGM 
Age at onset of conflict     
      Seven  −0.19  −0.15***  −0.13***  −0.28*** 
 [0.11] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] 
      Eight  −0.13  −0.12***  −0.09***  −0.21*** 
 [0.09] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
       Nine  −0.13*  −0.06***  −0.05***  −0.14*** 
 [0.07] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] 
       Ten  −0.08  −0.08***  −0.09***  −0.09** 
 [0.07] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] 
       Eleven  −0.04 0.01 0.01  −0.03 
 [0.04] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] 
       Twelve  −0.02  −0.02  −0.07*** 0.07 
 [0.06] [0.02] [0.01] [0.07] 
     
Child is female  −0.08***  −0.06***  −0.03***  −0.16*** 
 [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] 
Female*age at onset of conflict     
      Seven 0.09* 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.24*** 
 [0.05] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] 
      Eight 0.10** 0.07*** 0.04** 0.17*** 
 [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] 
       Nine 0.07 0.05** 0.03 0.16*** 
 [0.06] [0.02] [0.02] [0.05] 
       Ten 0.05 0.04***  −0.01** 0.18*** 
 [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] [0.06] 
       Eleven  −0.02  −0.03**  −0.07*** 0.12*** 
 [0.04] [0.01] [0.02] [0.03] 
       Twelve  −0.04  −0.03  −0.02*  −0.01 
       [0.07] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] 
Prewar wealth 0.01*** 0.01** 0.04*** 0.005*** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.01] [0.001] 
     
Intercept  0.06  0.23***   0.02***   0.32*** 
 [0.03] [0.01] [0.01]   [0.03] 
     
Province fixed effects Yes No No No 
Year of birth fixed effects Yes No No No 
Sample Size 5,706 5,706 3,998 1,708 
 Source: UNFPA Enquête Démographique et de Santé (2002).  
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TABLE 6. CGM Regressions of Schooling, Conflict, Gender, and Household Wealth 
                                             with Alternative Measures of Conflict Exposure (Robustness) 
 Dependent variable: 
Child completed six years 
 of primary schooling 
    (1)    (2)     (3)    (4)     (5)      (6)    (7) 
Moved 
residence 
Displaced 
in camp 
Three 
measures 
Poor only Nonpoor 
only 
1978–82 
cohorts 
excluded 
1971–74 
cohorts 
excluded 
  CGM CGM CGM CGM CGM CGM CGM 
Violent conflict shock    −0.08***  −0.08***  −0.10**  −0.09***  −0.06*** 
   [0.02] [0.01] [0.04] [0.02] [0.01] 
Times moved residence  −0.08***   −0.06***  −0.06***  −0.07***   
 [0.01]  [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]   
Years in displacement camp     
−0.06*** 
   
−0.02*** 
0.01  −0.04***   
  [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]   
Child is female  −0.05***  −0.05***  −0.06***  −0.04***  −0.15***  −0.08***  −0.03*** 
 [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] 
Violent conflict*female   0.01 0.01 0.10*** 0.06*  −0.01 
   [0.02] [0.01] [0.03] [0.01] [0.01] 
Moved residence*female 0.02***  0.02**  −0.02*** 0.03**   
 [0.00]  [0.01] [0.01] [0.00]   
Years in camp*female  0.02*** 0.00  −0.01*** 0.02***   
  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]   
Age in years  
−0.006*** 
0.001  −0.01***  −0.01***  −0.01***  −0.01*** 0.01 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Prewar wealth 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.04*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 
 [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.01]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] 
Intercept 0.31*** 0.20*** 0.46*** 0.41***  0.52*** 0.27*** 0.18*** 
 [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04] 
        
Province fixed effects No No No No No No No 
Birth cohort fixed effects  No No No No No No No 
Sample size 5,706 5,706 5,706 3,998 1,708 3,981 4,550 
     Source: UNFPA Enquête Démographique et de Santé (2002). 
Note: Standard errors are presented between brackets. All regressions are clustered at the province level and are weighted with the sample weights 
provided in the data set. *** significant at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent.
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careers and the treated group did. The result, again computed with the CGM method, is 
very similar to the one obtained in our baseline regression. For the 1971–1974 cohorts, 
the argument can be made that these cohorts are rather old, which may lead to a bias in 
the estimation of the time trend if the slope changes significantly over time. However, 
omitting these cohorts from the estimation (in column 7) leads to similar results.  
 
V. Issues of concern for the identification strategy: 
Poverty, prewar trends, selective survival, and selective migration 
 
A first issue of concern for our identification strategy is that we may measure the 
effect of something other than exposure to violent conflict. If, for example, massacres 
were more intense or the civil war lasted longer in poor provinces compared to nonpoor 
provinces, then we may be measuring the effect of poverty instead of exposure to violent 
conflict. Although we control for wealth (in the form of livestock) in our regression 
analysis, this variable is measured at the household level. Because our exposure variable 
is measured at the province level, we must ensure that we are not capturing another 
effect. To that end, we analyzed data on the death rate in 1993 and the duration of the 
civil war in poor and nonpoor provinces. Poverty is measured as the percentage of the 
population under the poverty line in 1990 (prior to the start of the massacres and the civil 
war). A province is defined as poor if the percentage of the population under the poverty 
line is higher than 36.2 percent, the poverty headcount in Burundi in 1990. The difference 
in the 1993 death rate between poor and nonpoor provinces was −5.3 percentage points; 
however, this difference is not statistically significant at the usual thresholds. Similarly, 
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the difference in the duration of the civil war between poor and nonpoor provinces is six 
months, but it is not statistically significant. Bundervoet et al. (2009) find very few 
correlations between the timing of the conflict onset (no, early, or late) at the province 
level, the length of exposure to conflict at the individual level, and a range of household 
characteristics. We conclude from this finding that there appears to be no selection into 
violence of provinces or individuals based on prewar characteristics. Therefore, it appears 
unlikely that our exposure variable is capturing a wealth or other effect. 
Second, although we include province fixed effects in our specifications to control 
for time-invariant province characteristics, there may be a problem of endogeneity with 
time-varying province characteristics. To test for that endogeneity, we analyze the 
potential correlation between a prewar province-level trend in primary school completion 
rates and the duration of conflict in that province. To this end, we compute a prewar 
trend, defined as the difference between the average school completion rate of the three 
oldest (1971–1973) and the three youngest (1978–1980) prewar cohorts, and we regress 
this trend on the duration of violent conflict in the province. We perform this test at the 
province and the individual level. The results are presented in the online appendix, tables 
A1 and A2. We do not find any statistically significant effects in various specifications 
using the usual thresholds. We note that the specification in table 3, column 2 also 
includes a province-specific time trend.  
A third issue is potential bias caused by selective survival. Because the survey, by 
definition, only contains data on children who survived violence until the time of the 
survey, we must account for potential survivor bias in the sample. Particularly, if death 
during the conflict was not a random event, we may over- or underestimate the effects of 
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the conflict on schooling depending on the direction of the bias. The debate on the 
selectivity of violence in Burundi is ongoing (Bundervoet 2009; Voors et al. 2012). The 
findings in Bundervoet (2009) suggest that the violent conflict affected the schooling of 
not only children who were school aged during the conflict but also those who had 
completed their primary education. Education in times of conflict in Burundi has proved 
to be a liability. Thus, our nonaffected cohort (1971–1980, in our approach not affected 
during their primary school career) suffers survival bias; the most educated cohort 
members were killed in 1993. Thus, on average, this cohort was more educated than we 
infer from the survivors in the 2002 survey. Assuming that there is no such survival bias 
for the affected cohort (which is likely because in 1993, they were too young to be 
targeted), the negative effect that we find for the affected cohort would then be an 
underestimate of the true effect. We investigate this claim together with the next issue. 
Fourth, in addition to selective killing, we may face a problem of selective 
migration. If migrants have a profile that differs from stayers, then we may over- or 
underestimate the impact of violent conflict on stayers. We thus need to address two 
potential threats: (i) people killed in the 1993 massacres and the subsequent civil war may 
have had a different profile than survivors; (ii) people who have migrated since 1993 may 
have a different profile than those who did not migrate. The latter issue can be divided 
into three categories of migrants/refugees: (ii.a) those who were internally displaced, 
(ii.b) those who were refugees and who returned to Burundi before 2002, and (ii.c) those 
who went abroad but did not return before 2002.  
 Persons in categories (ii.a) and (ii.b) are included in the sample. As mentioned 
above, one of the strengths of the survey design in 2002 was that it surveyed people 
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living in displacement camps at the time of the survey. People who fled abroad but 
returned before 2002 are included because they were part of the target population at the 
time of the design of the survey. Thus, only groups (i) and (ii.c) represent a potential 
selection problem.  
 The 2002 survey allows us to investigate the profiles of people who were killed as 
well as migrants. We compare the profiles of households with and without at least one 
child killed in the 1993–2002 period (available in the online appendix, table A3). We 
conduct this comparison for the loss of boys as well as girls. Furthermore, we investigate 
the profiles of widowed persons. We find that parents who lost at least one daughter in 
the violence were less educated compared to parents who did not lose a daughter. 
Inferring from this finding that the killed daughters were more educated than the 
surviving daughters is premature given that the siblings (above age 15) of the deceased 
girls have a higher probability of completing primary education. This finding remains 
inconclusive for two other reasons: the low number of girls killed and the fact that we 
only dispose of the education data for siblings who still live in the parental home at the 
time of the survey. We do not find significant differences between the profiles of parents 
and siblings with and without at least one son killed. Regarding the death of spouses, we 
find a difference in the prewar level of livestock ownership. Households in which the 
husband died in the 1993–2002 period had significantly more livestock than households 
in which the husband was alive at the time of the survey.  
These findings do not conflict with those of Bundervoet (2009). First, he also 
finds a higher level of prewar livestock among households with members killed, and 
second, his finding was based on the observation that fathers who were killed had more 
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educated children. However, we are interested in the level of education of the deceased 
children, not the deceased fathers. A large part of the latter (and thus of Bundervoet’s 
assertion) are born before 1971, a cohort that is not relevant for this paper. 
Given that we only computed the profiles of parents, siblings, or husband/wives 
of people who were born in the 1971–1986 period and given that most of the above 
findings are not very conclusive or do not point in one clear direction, we conclude that 
selection bias caused by nonrandom killings is unlikely to bias our estimates in a 
particular direction. 
 We draw the same conclusion for the case of the migrants/refugees. Because we 
do not have data on the people who did not return to Burundi at the time of the survey, 
we attempt to obtain a profile by proxy. The closest we can get to the long-term refugees 
not registered in the 2002 survey is to consider the profile of those refugees who were 
abroad for many years and then returned to Burundi. From the figures (table A3.3) and in 
comparison with the stayers, these long-term refugees were slightly older, had a lower 
share of women, and had more educated heads of households. Had they returned, it would 
have increased the percentage that completed primary schooling in the nonaffected cohort 
(born 1971–1980). In that case, the estimates we find for the cohorts affected by violence 
can be considered an underestimate of the true effect. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 There is no universal theory that allows us to predict the direction of the gender 
effect of violent conflict on schooling. In times of peace, girls in Burundi are less likely 
to complete primary schooling compared to boys. This negative gender effect, 
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irrespective of violent conflict, is a robust finding in all our specifications. However, is 
there an additional gender effect on schooling as a result of violent conflict? We find that 
the schooling of boys is negatively affected by conflict. For girls, we find that exposure to 
violent conflict reduces the gender gap in schooling, but only for girls from nonpoor 
households. This finding is confirmed across specifications and is consistent with the 
observations in Obura (2008), which present declining gross enrollment rates during the 
civil war but a stable and even slightly increasing Gender Parity Index. Exposure to 
violent conflict did not affect the gender gap in schooling between boys and girls from 
poor households. 
 The losses that we find in terms of schooling as well as the narrowing of the 
gender gap do not necessarily apply to other settings. Justino (2011) observes that the 
micro-level effects depend on the type of conflict and the socioeconomic profile of the 
victims. The magnitude of the observed effect in Burundi, a decline in the probability of 
completing primary schooling by 4 to 6 percentage points per year of exposure, cannot be 
compared straightforwardly with findings in papers using other dependent or independent 
variables. In her overview, Justino (2011) mentions a range of 0.4 to 1.2 years of 
education lost because of violent conflict. The magnitude of the effect in Shemyakina 
(2006), between 4 and 7 percentage points lower probability of completing the mandatory 
nine years in Tajikistan, is somewhat lower than our range of estimates of 7 to 17 
percentage points for the exposed versus the nonexposed cohorts.  
 Policymakers should consider that conflict shocks may have different 
distributional consequences than the well-known economic or climatic shocks. Whereas 
price fluctuations or rain-level variability are known to affect the poorest part of the 
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population much more than the nonpoor part, this is not necessarily the case in the event 
of shocks of a political nature, such as massacres or civil war. This paper demonstrates 
that groups considered least vulnerable in the development economics literature—boys, 
in general, and boys from nonpoor households, in particular—are most severely affected 
by violent conflict in terms of educational attainment. Primary school completion rates 
for boys from nonpoor households decrease to the level of girls from nonpoor households 
in case of exposure to violent conflict. As a result, the gender gap in schooling narrowed 
considerably during the conflict in Burundi among nonpoor households. 
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Notes 
1 For an analysis of the health consequences of the civil war in Burundi, we refer to Bundervoet et al. 
(2009), Health and Civil War in Rural Burundi, Journal of Human Resources, 44, 2, p. 536–563. 
2 For details on the sampling method, we refer to annex B of the survey report “Situation démographique et 
sociale du Burundi: Résultats de l’enquête socio-démographique et de santé de la reproduction ESDR 
Burundi 2002,” published by UNFPA Burundi. 
3 Although the civil war lasted longer (until 2005), we only consider the relevant part of the war for our 
identification strategy: the potential exposure of children of primary school age from the birth cohorts 
under consideration (1971–1986) 
4 We also clustered at the province-year of birth level, resulting in 256 clusters, which reduced the standard 
errors while yielding the same coefficients. However, we do not prefer this method because the 
intraprovince year of birth clusters may be correlated with each other. Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008, 
414) argue against clustering at the region-year level. 
5 This drawback was confirmed by Judson Caskey in an email to us. We used the cgmreg do-file on 
professor Caskey’s website to install the command.  
6 The figures in table 6, as in all tables, are rounded off at two decimals for aesthetic reasons. The 
coefficient and the standard error of the gender*years in the camp variable in column 4 are, for example,  
−0.0125 [0.0032]. 
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APPENDIX to “Schooling, Violent Conflict and Gender in Burundi” 
published in WBER, by Philip Verwimp and Jan Van Bavel  
 
 
 
 
TABLE A1: Test for pre-war common trend in primary  
school completion rates at the province level 
 
 Pre-war trend in primary 
school completion 
Pre-war trend in primary 
school completion 
              OLS                  OLS 
Completion rate at  
baseline  
0.03  [0.40] -0.03  [0.41] 
   
Duration of violent 
Conflict 
0.003  [0.02] 0.05  [0.07] 
   
Duration squared  -0.01  [0.01] 
   
Constant 0.09  [0.01] 0.06  [0.09] 
N 16 16 
Source: UNFPA Enquête Démographique et de Santé (2002).  
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * 10%. Standard errors between brackets. Trend is defined as 
the difference in the average primary school completion rate between the oldest three pre-war  
cohorts (1971-1973) and the youngest three (1978-1980). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A2: Test for pre-war trend in school completion rates and  
duration of conflict, pre-war (1971-1980) cohorts only 
 
Dependent variable: 
Child completed 6 years 
 of primary schooling 
    (1) 
 
         (2) 
 
   LPM    CGM 
Duration of Conflict -0.015 -0.010 
 [0.07] [0.09] 
   
Age  -0.01* 
  [0.02] 
   
Violent Conflict * Age 0.0005 -0.0009 
 [0.002] [0.002] 
   
   
Intercept     0.08  0.62* 
   [0.05] [0.21] 
   
Province Fixed Effects   Yes No 
Birth Cohort Fixed Effects    Yes No 
Sample Size   3183 3183 
Source: UNFPA Enquête Démographique et de Santé (2002) 
*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * 10%. Standard errors between brackets. 
        Standards errors are clustered at the province-year level and regressions are weighted  
        with the sample weights provided in the survey. 
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TABLE A3: potential selection problems 
 
Table A3.1: Sons and daughters born in 1971-1986 who died violently in 1993-2002 
 Households with 
no violent death  
1993-2002 
Households with at 
least one violent 
death 1993-2002 
Difference 
(3)-(1) and 
(4)-(2) 
       (1)      (2)     (3)     (4)   (5)    (6) 
    boys    girls   boys   girls boys  girls 
Head of household 
completed primary 
education  
0.34 0.34 0.29 0.20 -0.05 -0.14** 
mother completed 
primary education 
0.07 0.07 0.05 0 -0.02 -0.07** 
Same-sex siblings 
completed primary 
education 
0.23 0.17 0.21 0.25 -0.02 +0.08 
Pre-war wealth 2.05 2.0 2.12 2.1 0.07 0.1 
N 1278 1420 55 35  
 
 
 
Table A3.2: Widowed persons born in 1971-1986 who lost their husband/wife 1993-2002 
 Households  
without death  
1993-2002 
Households with at 
 least one death 
 1993-2002 
Difference 
(3)-(1) and (4)-(2) 
   (1)    (2)     (3)    (4)    (5)   (6) 
 husband 
alive 
wife 
alive 
husband  
died 
wife  
died 
husbands wives 
Wife completed 
prim education 
0.16 0.19 0.18 0.26 0.02 0.07 
Pre-war wealth 0.96 0.99 1.73 0.59 0.77*** -0.40 
N 1547 1544 85 19  
Note: Correlation coefficient between level of education of both partners in a  
married couple is 0.48*** 
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Table A3.3: Migration abroad after 1993 and return before 2002; 1971-1986 birth cohorts 
     (1)           (2)            (3)      (4) 
 Never 
moved  
Moved abroad 
and returned 
before 2002 
Moved abroad for at 
least 4 years and 
returned before 2002 
Difference  
(3)-(1) 
Age 22.35 22.57 22.85 0.50* 
Sexe 0.59 0.53 0.52 -0.07** 
Pre-war wealth 1.72 1.79 1.62 -0.10 
Head of household 
educated (sons and 
daughters only) 
0.37 0.46 0.58 0.20*** 
N 6725 1169 173  
Source: UNFPA Enquête Démographique et de Santé (2002) 
